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Summary
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was 
formally closed on 21 December 2017. During the quarter century of its exist-
ence, ICTY’s rulings had a significant impact on public discourses and narra-
tives about the Bosnian war. Different opinions among the citizens of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (BiH) about ICTY’s role and its verdicts have emerged over 
time, especially among the leaders of the dominant ethno-political parties re-
presenting the three ethno-constituent groups – Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. 
Milorad Dodik, current member of the BiH Presidency, a former President of 
Republika Srpska (RS) entity, and the leader of one of the most prominent po-
litical parties in RS, was particularly vocal and critical about the work of the 
ICTY. This paper closely examines Dodik’s public views and opinions toward 
the ICTY. We use content- and operational code analysis to analyze key fea-
tures of his perceptions toward the ICTY’s work while serving as the Presi-
dent of RS for two consecutive terms. 
Keywords: ICTY, Milorad Dodik, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnian War, Per-
ceptions, Crimes, Operational Code
Introduction
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (henceforth the ICTY) 
was established in 1993 by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in line 
with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as a response to mass atrocities taking place in 
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time. It aimed to bring the most respon-
sible individuals to justice “for appalling acts such as murder, torture, rape, enslave-
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ment, destruction of property”. Since its establishment, the Court has irrevocably 
intended to change “the landscape of international humanitarian law and provide 
victims an opportunity to voice the horrors they witnessed and experienced” (ICTY, 
2019). By doing this, the ICTY also aimed to prevent any future crimes, to bring 
justice to all victims and their families and, as the end goal, to contribute to the 
long-lasting peace in the countries of former Yugoslavia. The ICTY’s precedent-
setting decisions on war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide showed that 
“an individual’s senior position can no longer protect them from prosecution”. Bos-
niak population, in particular, believed this to be very positive for development of 
relations in the conflict’s aftermath (Subotić, 2009: 129).
Prior to its official closing on 21 December 2017, the official ICTY Prosecu-
tion reports pointed to 160 persons being charged for war crimes perpetuated on for-
mer Yugoslavia’s territory. During its work, the greatest number of cases prosecuted 
at the Tribunal have dealt with alleged crimes committed by Bosnian Serbs and Yu-
goslav National Army. However, the Tribunal investigated cases of war crimes per-
petuated by Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks as well. In the initial phase, the Bosniak-
dominated central government of BiH prioritized helping the ICTY to arrest some 
high-ranking Bosnian Serb officials (Lamont, 2010: 125). 
After 24 years of work the ICTY closed its doors, which resulted in diffe-
rent opinions among the public and political elites worldwide and especially in the 
countries that were affected by the 1990’s war (Bonora, 2019: 124-125). In BiH, 
various political actors were particularly vocal in their opinion on the ICTY’s clo-
sure, among them, Milorad Dodik, leader of the largest political party in Republika 
Srpska entity, current member of the BiH Presidency, and a former Prime Minister 
and President of RS. Dodik’s public perceptions of the ICTY are often interpreted 
as negative and undermining its existence and role of the ICTY, in spite of the fact 
that the Government of RS, under Dodik’s leadership in 2005 and 2006, forwarded 
documents to the ICTY’s Office of the Prosecutor as well as to the BiH Prosecu-
tor’s Office, and appointed a working group for cooperation with the ICTY (Orent-
licher, 2010: 30).
The main goal of this paper is to examine Dodik’s public attitudes toward the 
ICTY, and whether or not they have changed or evolved during the first mandate 
(2010-2014), and the second mandate (2014-2018) as the President of RS. We use 
Walker, Schafer and Young’s (1998) operational code, which enables us to under-
stand how former RS President Dodik publicly reacted and articulated his public 
criticism toward ICTY at a specific time, and thus, shaped the public narrative in 
RS and in BiH not only on the nature, role and successes of the ICTY in post-con-
flict transformation of the country, but also on the prospects of the general societal 
reconciliation and in light of the current political challenges. In order to understand 
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Milorad Dodik’s evolution in perceptions toward the ICTY we examine his public 
statements and rhetoric in the major media in BiH. This is a comparative study and 
will aim to outline the key differences between the two terms as RS President. In 
order to better understand Dodik’s perceptions, we divided them in three clusters, 
which are later on compared and analyzed in detail, guided by the results obtained 
in the operational code analysis. 
This article contributes to the existing literature on political party leadership, by 
examining the relationship between party leaders’ personality, norms and rhetoric, 
and general consequences of their actions in shaping the public opinion in order to 
fulfill their party’s defined (ethno)political interests. There are a few contemporary 
studies addressing the relationship between influential political party leaders’ inter-
action with their followers and voters (cf. Steinberg, 2008; Greenstein, 2009), and 
some that expand beyond the analysis of electoral politics and leaders’ center-stage 
positions in shaping public opinions (cf. Aarts et al., 2011; Bittner, 2011). We will 
focus on the position of Milorad Dodik as a party leader and the President of RS and 
examine his communicative performance and consistency in relation to ICTY. 
1. Mapping Dodik’s Political Perceptions and his Role in Shaping Public 
Discourses
Milorad Dodik appeared as a candidate in the first multiparty elections in 1990, 
when he was elected a member of Parliament. Although Dodik served as a delegate 
of Serb Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka, SDS) in the RS Assembly 
during the Bosnian war, after the end of the conflict, he worked hard on establishing 
an image of a “moderate”, appealing to the international community that eventu-
ally endorsed his rise to power. In 1996, he founded the Party of Independent Social 
Democrats (SNSD)1 to challenge the dominance of Karadžić’s SDS. Soon after, en-
tity President Biljana Plavšić nominated Dodik for Prime Minister of RS, in spite 
of the fact that his party had only secured two seats in the entity’s Assembly (Šedo, 
2007: 223-235). Although it lost power to the SDS in 2001, Dodik soon reemerged 
as a viable option for Western political patrons due to his more moderate platform 
during the political power shift in 2006, when the international community gradu-
ally returned political sovereignty back to institutions in BiH. Over time, Dodik 
and the party he led attracted exponentially more members and became the strong-
est political party in RS. His political agenda slowly developed along the lines of 
strong nationalist rhetoric and socially-oriented populism, merged with a cunningly 
enveloped pro-EU stance (Hasić and Sijamija, 2018). 
1 The SNSD is not a classical “successor party”. It was created in 1996, and has transformed since 
then. It could be classified as a nationalist and secessionist party (Stojarova, 2009).
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His public support for the European integrations has transformed and faded 
over time. For Dodik, it became clear that it is more lucrative to be politically na-
tionalist than moderate and cooperative, and thus he “upgraded” his rhetoric to fit 
his newly formed goals of consolidating power in RS and within BiH institutions 
(Hooper, 2015). After realizing that entities have lost huge chunks of their decision-
making power over time, and that further dismantling of the Dayton Peace Agree-
ment (DPA) by both Office of High Representative (OHR) and Bosniak political 
forces would inevitably lead to further loss of power, Dodik took upon himself the 
task to “safeguard the DPA” hoping it would not only preserve RS as a separate en-
tity, but that it would eventually allow it to gain enough political and institutional 
independence to secede from BiH. His appeal among the Serb electorate has risen 
proportionately by antagonizing calls of the Bosniak leaders for abolition of RS as 
a “product of genocide” (Clark, 2014: 104). 
Dodik and his government maintained a strong public presence and influence 
by controlling the editorial board of the public broadcasting service in the RS – 
Radio Television of the Republic of Srpska (RTRS), thus establishing and reinfor-
cing a highly centralized and much concentrated political power within the RS in 
comparison to the Federacija BiH entity (Hasić and Karabegović, 2018: 8). Dodik 
also remained heavily involved in micro-managing the party organization, outlin-
ing its key political strategies and reforms, and personally supervising relations 
with the general public. He constantly articulated party views in media reports as 
if these were a priori party-approved. Thus his messages were crafted to appeal to 
large masses, and clear and clear-cut vocalization of their ethnic-based “protection-
ist policies” was designed to bring the voters closer to their leader’s vision, while 
concrete policies and the party’s issue-orientations remained secondary. These stra-
tegies were further enhanced by exerting high levels of control over editorial poli-
tics in public broadcasting, and utilizing public structures and resources for private 
ends or trading favors, locally known as štela (Hasić, 2020).
Dodik’s public views and positions toward the ICTY have been particularly 
controversial, uneven and challenged. The RS government initially opposed the 
surrender of suspects among Bosnian Serb perpetrators of war crimes, but this ap-
proach softened in the first term of the RS former Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, 
who allowed the Tribunal to open an office in Banja Luka and appointed a working 
group for cooperation with the ICTY. He even said that “the public mood had shift-
ed to a degree that surrendering Serbs to the Tribunal was no longer seen as the act 
of a traitor, but instead as a courageous step” (Orentlicher, 2010: 30). 
Dodik’s vocabulary was later negatively directed toward international offi-
cials, judges, political elites in “Sarajevo circles”, adding that the resentment to-
ward international officials was fueled even more by the international recognition 
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of Srebrenica genocide. Dodik’s rhetoric confronted the General Framework Agree-
ment for Peace with his idea of RS as a unit entitled to self-determination, with 
which he had awoken the passions that led BiH into 1992-1995 Bosnian war (Toal, 
2013). Dodik often uses words such as “terror” and “history falsification” to clarify 
his positions, and habitually equates them with the negative role the international 
community had in the post-conflict reconstruction of BiH. He does not focus on 
what ICTY’s “biased” judgments bring to the multicultural post-conflict BiH soci-
ety, but rather he focuses on what they fail to do and how they negatively affect the 
positions of Serbs within Bosnian society. Such “relativization and equalization” 
works for Dodik to maintain his “genuine Serb” image, a person who belongs to 
his people, a person close to the Serb electorate, equal to them rather than above 
them (Hasić, 2020). His political views have influenced the policy-making and the 
perceptions of people following him. Dodik’s constant rhetoric about Serbian war 
heroes, the incompetence and unfairness of the ICTY and his general disagreement 
with the work of the ICTY, all lead to slow but effective change of perceptions of 
residents of RS as well. 
2. Methodology: Data Collection and Analysis
We initially collected and systematized Milorad Dodik’s statements on the ICTY 
made during his first term as the President of RS, from 15 November 2010, and 
during the second term, from 12 October 2014, until ICTY’s final closure on 21 De-
cember 2017. Then, we conducted a qualitative content and operational code analy-
sis of his statements (cf. Walker, Schafer and Young, 1998). We aimed to scrutinize 
the impact of Dodik’s publicly expressed perceptions on the nature and work of the 
ICTY, and implications that such perceptions might have had on certain policy ori-
entations and/or outcomes.
We started with coding reoccurring Dodik’s public statements, paying special 
attention in which of his two terms speeches took place, clustering the statements in 
two groups: speeches from the first term in group number one and from the second 
in group number two. In order to assess the operational code beliefs, we employed 
the Verbs in Context System (VICS). As a method of content analysis, “VICS draws 
inferences about a decision maker’s operational code beliefs from public statements 
such as speeches or interviews made by the decision maker” showing choice pro-
pensities for conflictual and cooperative actions in world politics as well (Walker, 
Schafer and Young, 1998). Moreover, we engaged in examination of five philo-
sophical and five instrumental propensities identified by George (1979) and Holsti 
(1977), where we evaluated what authors identify as “attribution properties that the 
leader expresses, conceptualized as positive or negative valences for self-other be-
havior”. This is further amplified by using four features of the scoring system, and 
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firstly diagnosing the use of power by others in the political universe and the lea-
der’s own propensities for exercising political power, positive and negative sanc-
tions. Finally, we focused on the operational code analysis of the verbs in the lea-
der’s rhetoric. It was important to do this because they “indicate the balance, central 
tendency, and dispersion of these forms of power attributed to the self and others as 
descriptions of self-other relationships” (cf. Walker et al., 1998: 177). 
Table 2. The Operational Code Dimensions
Philosophical Questions Instrumental Questions
P-1 What is the “essential” nature of political life? Is the 
political universe one of harmony or conflict? What is 
the fundamental character of one’s political opponents? 
P-2 What are the prospects for the eventual realization 
of one’s fundamental political values and aspirations? 
Can one be optimistic or must one be pessimistic on this 
score, and in what respects the one and/or the other? 
P-3 Is the political future predictable? In what sense and 
to what extent? 
P-4 How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over 
historical development? What is one’s role in “moving” 
and “shaping” history in the desired direction? 
P-5 What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in 
historical development? 
I-1 What is the best approach for se-
lecting goals or objectives for political 
action? 
I-2 How are the goals of action pur-
sued most effectively? 
I-3 How are the risks of political action 
calculated, controlled, and accepted? 
I-4 What is the best “timing” of action 
to advance one’s interests? 
I-5 What is the utility and role of dif-
ferent means for advancing one’s in-
terest?
Source: George (1979) cited in Walker, Schafer and Young (1998)
At the core of the operational code analysis are three dimensions with a com-
mon focus upon the power relationships between self and others. Namely, they are 
the following: (1) diagnostic propensities, (2) choice propensities, and (3) shift pro-
pensities in the management of conflict and bargaining with others, which the lead-
er exhibits through positive and negative attributions to the self and others (Walker 
et al., 1998). We identified Dodik’s operational code as “a belief system”, which is 
made of ideas and attitudes in which “elements are bound together by some form of 
functional interdependence”. These helped us to characterize the self-other valences 
as forms of behavior, whether cooperative or conflictual, that represent the exercise 
of political power between the Self and Other(s) (cf. ibid.: 176). 
We characterized the valences as cooperative or conflictual, depending on the 
keywords he used while speaking about the ICTY and processed them by using 
VICS, a content analysis system for retrieving and identifying attributions in speech. 
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We concentrated on three dimensions, propensities, of a power between the Self and 
Others in the leader’s perceptions of the ICTY. We then continued in understand-
ing whether the leader’s attribution was positive/cooperative (+) versus negative/
conflictual (-) valences toward the ICTY in order to examine his stances toward the 
Tribunal in his first and second term (ibid.: 178). What was important at this stage 
was to do the diagnostic propensities and attribute positive/cooperative (+) versus 
negative/conflictual (-) valences to others and by doing this we attempted to under-
stand Dodik’s nature of politics (P-1), realization of political values (P-2), political 
future (P-3) and other questions as well. In order to find the answers to the opera-
tional code questions dealing with the previously mentioned propensities, we used 
the following reasoning to link to the indices with the concepts in the operational 
code construct. Diagnostic propensities such as the leader’s net attribution of posi-
tive/ cooperative (+) versus negative/ conflictual (-) valences to others indicate the 
answers to the first philosophical question dealing with the nature of politics (P-1), 
as indicated below (cf. Nhandara, 2015).
In addition, we identified the keywords in the corpus of the text which ena-
bled us to investigate the patterns of collocation between keywords which gave us 
the pattern of occurrence and by which we understood how Dodik spoke about the 
ICTY and in which context. By using the transitive verb classification in VICS, we 
were able to spot cooperative and conflictual words in Dodik’s speech, which in the 
end showed us his stance toward the ICTY. Dodik’s speeches and keywords were 
identified and clustered in groups “Mandate 1” and “Mandate 2”, meaning: the first 
and second term in office as President of RS. Later on, we explored the differences 
in Dodik’s rhetoric in Mandate 1 and Mandate 2 by summing up all the results we 
got after the analysis and by dividing it by the number of statements, hence getting 
an average number. In the first Mandate, the total number of analyzed statements 
was 9, and in the second Mandate, there were 10 statements in total.
After obtaining the average number, by making a scale of intensity varying 
from “very slight intensity” to “extreme intensity”, we explained the intensity of 
Dodik’s statements toward the ICTY, Serbs, Bosniaks, and other subjects. The re-
sults show whether he was cooperative or conflictual, pessimistic or optimistic, 
what was the political future, where the locus of control was situated, what were his 
tactics, what was the timing of cooperation and control, etc. 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 below show the results for each index after the VICS analysis 
and the average value when the numbers were totaled and divided by the number 
of statements.
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Table 3. Dodik’s First Mandate
Average 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
P-1 (outlook on 




-0,236 -0,125 - 0,091 -0,179 -0,370 -0,143 -0,182 -0,424 - 0,550 -0,064
P-3 (ability to 
foresee political 
events)




0,571 0,314 0,446 0,250 0,407 0,653 0,815 0,867 0,615 0,778
P-5 (role of 
accidents) 0,690 0,692 0,778 0,370 0,615 0,815 0,867 0,940 0,583 0,552
I-1 (strategy 
direction) 0,256 0,093 0,288 -0,778 0,314 1,000 0,867 -0,235 0,757 0,000
I-2 (strength of 
tactics) 0,224 0,265 0,257 -0,200 0,526 -0,250 0,757 0,910 -0,407 0,168
I-3 (risk 
propensity) 0,189 0,757 0,501 -0,692 0,250 -0,143 0,408 0,757 -0,370 0,233
I-4a (timing of 
the tactics) 0,373 -0,433 0,653 0,818 0,400 0,168 0,265 0,407 0,857 0,222
I-4b (timing 
of words and 
actions)
0,024 0,971 0,000 -0,833 -0,433 0,653 -0,333 0,250 0,409 -0,462
I-5a (role of 
progress) 0,448 1,000 0,289 0,583 0,910 0,526 0,000 0,815 0,714 -0,800
I-5b (role of 
promise of gains) 0,002 0,265 0,179 0,133 0,757 -0,511 -0,125 -0,133 0,238 -0,778
I-5c (role of 
support and 
challenge)
0,237 -0,143 0,064 0,818 -0,600 0,461 0,258 0,408 0,424 0,446
I-5d (role of 
punishments) 0,134 0,097 0,545 -0,359 -0,750 0,233 -0,209 0,769 0,504 0,382
I-5e (role of 
losses) 0,314 0,940 0,782 0,200 0,832 0,402 -0,370 0,000 -0,615 0,655
I-5f (role of 
defiance) 0,356 0,945 0,000 0,168 0,867 0,552 0,778 0,182 0,407 -0,692
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Table 4. Dodik’s Second Mandate 
Average 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
P-1 (outlook 














0,419 0,669 0,665 0,056 1,000 0,412 0,667 0,444 0,167 0,223 -0,112
P-5 (role of 
accidents) 0,055 0,083 0,297 -0,600 0,183 0,456 -0,824 0,167 0,048 0,857 -0,116
I-1 (strategy 
direction) 0,171 0,889 0,667 0,400 -0,139 0,163 -0,217 -0,069 0,155 -0,364 0,226
I-2 (strength of 
tactics) 0,174 0,287 0,083 0,445 -0,524 0,600 -0,350 0,707 0,000 0,121 0,372
I-3 (risk 
propensity) 0,469 0,467 0,406 0,500 0,059 0,554 0,925 0,236 0,273 0,616 0,656
I-4a (timing of 
the tactics) 0,076 -0,112 0,533 0,000 0,866 -0,824 0,000 -0,112 0,064 0,333 0,021
I-4b (timing 
of words and 
actions)
0,336 0,849 0,000 0,696 -0,169 -0,169 0,578 0,230 0,183 0,616 0,550
I-5a (role of 
progress) 0,232 0,715 0,200 -0,556 -0,296 -0,111 0,166 0,328 0,545 0,785 0,320
I-5b (role of 
promise of 
gains)
0,139 0,091 -0,424 0,856 0,526 0,136 0,143 0,087 -0,337 0,500 - 0,183
I-5c (role of 
support and 
challenge)
0,114 0,200 0,941 -0,313 0,000 0,096 0,457 -0,139 -0,323 0,000 0,230
I-5d (role of 
punishments) 0,098 0,333 0,232 0,089 -0,117 0,333 -0,160 -0,600 0,656 0,217 0,000
I-5e (role of 
losses) 0,144 -1,000 0,325 -0,211 0,616 0,116 0,000 0,550 0,000 0,451 0,600
I-5f (role of 
defiance) 0,411 -0,115 0,185 0,349 1,000 0,305 0,963 -0,431 1,000 0,646 0,217
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Table 5. Operational Code Indices
Dodik’s First Mandate Dodik’s Second Mandate
Average Average
P-1 (outlook on the world) -0,560 P-1 (outlook on the world) 0,366
P-2 (possibilities of 
implementing political goals) -0,236
P-2 (possibilities of 
implementing political goals) 0,269
P-3 (ability to foresee political 
events) 0,403
P-3 (ability to foresee political 
events) 0,270
P-4 (control over historical 
developments) 0,571
P-4 (control over historical 
developments) 0,419
P-5 (role of accidents) 0,690 P-5 (role of accidents) 0,055
I-1 (strategy direction) 0,256 I-1 (strategy direction) 0,171
I-2 (strength of tactics) 0,225 I-2 (strength of tactics) 0,174
I-3 (risk propensity) 0,189 I-3 (risk propensity) 0,469
I-4a (timing of the tactics) 0,373 I-4a (timing of the tactics) 0,076
I-4b (timing of words and 
actions) 0,024
I-4b (timing of words and 
actions) 0,336
I-5a (role of progress) 0,448 I-5a (role of progress) 0,232
I-5b (role of promise of gains) 0,002 I-5b (role of promise of gains) 0,139
I-5c (role of support and 
challenge) 0,237
I-5c (role of support and 
challenge) 0,114
I-5d (role of punishments) 0,134 I-5d (role of punishments) 0,098
I-5e (role of losses) 0,314 I-5e (role of losses) 0,144
I-5f (role of defiance) 0,356 I-5f (role of defiance) 0,411
3. Interpretation of the Operational Code Analysis Results
Upon completion of the quantitative interpretation and analysis of the results on 
Milorad Dodik’s belief system generated through his public statements, we engage 
in grouping his statements in three clusters, depending on the main subject of his 
delivery. The first category refers to his views on “ICTY and Serb identity”, the 
second is on the ICTY as a “dysfunctional” and “inoperable” institution, while the 
third category relates to Dodik’s public perceptions on the international community, 
political decisions and other factors influencing ICTY’s work and its verdicts.
3.1. Dodik’s First Mandate as the President of RS
Dodik’s statements need to be taken in a wider context of societal ideologically-
based movement for relativization and equalization of guilt, as a means of reconcili-
ation based on numerical proportions or everyone’s relative and shared guilt for the 
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tragic events that happened during the war in BiH, aimed at neutralizing the narra-
tive established by ICTY’s verdicts on premeditated and planned Serb aggression 
and mass crimes against non-Serbs. The analysis of Dodik’s statements indicates a 
conflictual tone in the first mandate regarding the outlook on the world, and a hos-
tile view of the “political universe” (P-1 index and result of -0,560). His statements 
show a weak intensity of pessimism in relation to the realization of political val-
ues and possibilities of implementation of political goals (P-2 index and result of 
-0,236). Additionally, the results indicate he puts the “Self” as locus of control, and 
a high predictability of role of accidents, forecasting the future and political out-
comes of his actions, with the score of 0,690.
In one of his statements from 2012, Dodik highlights his basic postulate about 
the relations between the ICTY and “Serb identity”:
By leading the politics of selective justice at the expense of Serbs, in this verdict 
as well, it [the ICTY] tried to write the history in which the only culprits of this 
war were Serbs. We cannot escape the impression that even this verdict in the case 
against General Tolimir [Army of Republika Srpska, VRS] had a political back-
ground, especially after the acquittal of Ante Gotovina, Mladen Markač [Croa-
tian Council of Defense, HVO] and Ramush Haradinaj [Kosovo Liberation Army, 
KLA], and precisely because of that, we cannot trust the Hague Tribunal.2 
Another statement from the same year reflects a similar sentiment:
The acquitting verdict is shameful and humiliating for all Serb victims, who have 
been repetitively exposed to the unscrupulous international injustice that is being 
carried out by the ICTY.3
Dodik’s tendency is to establish himself as a “genuine Serb”, a person that be-
longs to and with the people. His intention is to get closer to his co-ethnics by pre-
senting himself as equal to them. The statements he made in public portrait Serbs as 
victims who are humiliated by the acquittal verdicts pronounced to non-Serbs tried 
before the ICTY. He uses words such as terror and history falsification in the same 
sentence, whereby the international community intends to create a false sense of ex-
ternalized responsibility within the denial culture Dodik was actively building dur-
ing both his terms at the top leadership positions in RS. He continued on the same 
ideological trajectory in the following years by stating:
2 December 2012. https://www.glassrpske.com/novosti/vijesti_dana/Sunovrat-pravde-za-laznu-
istoriju/lat/103182.html, accessed in June 2018.
3 November 2012. https://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/clanak/dodik-haski-sud-krivotvori-povijest-2012
1129, accessed in June 2018.
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It is not possible to prove the indictment for participation in a joint criminal enter-
prise (...) This qualification is reserved exclusively for Serbs and the political es-
tablishment of the Serb people in Republika Srpska and Serbia, while others have 
not been prosecuted for the crimes they committed (...) by doing so, it [the ICTY] 
works to materialize the imposed guilt to the Serbs through verdicts.4
and 
We all have seen how the former BiH Presidency member Ejup Ganić and others 
alike are being defended. Those who killed Serbs are referred to as war heroes by 
Bosniaks, and on the other hand, we Serbs say that all those who have committed 
crimes from our nation should go to The Hague and stand trial.5 
Paradoxically, Dodik attempts to highlight the bias of the ICTY against Serbs 
as the “ones who are solely responsible for war crimes”, thus diminishing its role 
and external validity of its rulings in the wider societal reconciliation process. At the 
same time, he attempts to legitimize Serbs and their political leadership as responsi-
ble and constructive in cooperating with the ICTY through highlighting dispropor-
tionately the increased level of internalized responsibility to label and extradite all 
“rotten apples” within their own ethnic corpus to the same Tribunal he holds to be 
prejudiced and unfair. 
The second cluster of sentences relates to Dodik’s public statements on the 
Tribunal as dysfunctional and useless. The first two related statements read the fol-
lowing: 
It is obvious that The Hague did not achieve its mission of neither prosecuting the 
crimes, nor did it succeed in increasing the degree of trust among the people. Fur-
thermore, I believe that due to The Hague’s practice, distrust among the people is 
even greater.6 
and 
The Hague Tribunal is not a court of justice, regardless of this verdict.7
Dodik’s main intent was to summarize the entire work of the Hague Tribunal 
as pointless and counter-productive with regard to increasing the trust among the 
former warring parties in BiH, which he acknowledges as one of its main goals. He 
4 April 2013. https://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/bih/Dodik-Nece-se-dokazati-udruzeni-zloci-
nacki-poduhvat/188263, accessed in June 2018.
5 June 2015. http://www.e-novine.com/entertainment/entertainment-licnosti/121984-Nismo-
sve-pobili-dakle-nije-bio-genocid.html, accessed in June 2018.
6 April 2013. http://lat.rtrs.tv/vijesti/vijest.php?id=84875, accessed in June 2018.
7 Slobodna Bosna. ‘Dodik: Haški tribunal nije sud pravde’. May 2013. https://www.slobodna-
bosna.ba/vijest/8172/dodik_haski_tribunal_nije_sud_pravde.html, accessed in June 2018.
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goes even one step further by saying that ICTY’s existence has widened the exist-
ent gap between people and nations of BiH even further. He is distancing himself 
and the RS leadership from the consequences of the failed reconciliation process, 
and he perceives and extracts the responsibility onto the international community 
he deeply distrusts. 
The second cited statement in this cluster refers to the initial verdict against 
Jadranko Prlić and other Croat military leaders of “Herceg-Bosna”, an unrecogni-
zed geopolitical entity and self-declared Croat statelet in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
In spite of the guilty judgment pronounced against all of them, Dodik maintains his 
characterization of the ICTY as “dysfunctional and ineffective”, because the Tribu-
nal has allegedly established its pattern of inconsistency toward the Serb political 
leadership, and the ad hoc verdicts against other military or political leaders can-
not change this narrative. He does not refer to what this judgment brings and what 
are its potential effects, but rather focuses on what it fails to do. In effect, this only 
indicates that Dodik’s vision of justice and ICTY’s role is politicized beyond his 
own comprehension, and that even verdicts that support his first goal of relativiza-
tion and equalization of guilt are secondary to his political goals of keeping ICTY’s 
dysfunctionality image alive. 
In the third cluster, there are two statements that support an argument on 
Dodik’s perception of the ICTY as a highly politicized body under direct Western 
influence and patronage. Namely, he states: 
The Hague Tribunal is a court of selective justice and has completely lost its 
legitimacy,8 (...) and I am assured that the international community wanted Ser-
bia to be definitely defeated through the Kosovo case. 
Dodik extends his initial argument by analyzing an armed conflict other than 
the one taking place in BiH, and includes Kosovo and the acquittal of Ramush 
Haradinaj (KLA) into a greater context to illustrate and justify his own views on 
ICTY’s politicized agenda and thus its ineffectiveness to bring justice and reconcili-
ation to the whole region. 
In his second statement, Dodik says: 
Now we can see that the Hague Tribunal has massively violated rights in this and 
other cases, and kept people in custody far longer than it is possible and allowed 
in any legal system.9
8 February 2013. https://www.kurir.rs/crna-hronika/672993/dodik-novi-svedok-karadzica, ac-
cessed in June 2018.
9 November 2014. ‘Haški sud je postao karikatura’. https://www.dw.com/sr/haški-sud-je-
postao-karikatura/a-18048739, accessed in June 2018.
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In this statement, Dodik is referring to the perceived violations of human rights 
in the case of Vojislav Šešelj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party, who was held in 
ICTY’s custody for 12 years without conviction due to the unusually protracted 
trial. Wording such as “longer than it is possible and allowed in any legal system” 
suggests that Dodik believes the ICTY is a hybrid political body which follows no 
recognized legal systems, and that being outside of any known legal framework al-
lowed it to develop some unconventional system features of its own, primarily di-
rected against the interests of Serbs. 
In general, Dodik’s first term as the RS President was predominantly charac-
terized by statements on the negative relationship between the Serbs and the Hague 
Tribunal, marked by its disfunctionality, partiality, and cases of selective justice at 
the expense of Serbs. Throughout his statements, he calls his people not to trust the 
ICTY, especially because the verdicts are humiliations for Serb victims who are ex-
posed to unscrupulous international injustice. He adds that the Tribunal has com-
pletely lost its legitimacy and operates outside of any recognized legal system. His 
aim is to keep the negative image of the ICTY to dilute his own people’s perceptions 
of guilt, and to numerically relativize all the war crimes committed by all ethnic 
groups engaged in the Bosnian war. 
3.2. Dodik’s Second Mandate as the President of RS
In analysing Dodik’s rhetoric in his second term, we used the same framework for 
the analysis, and divided the statements into three basic clusters covering the same 
thematic units as in the first term. 
The results show that in P-2 index, which refers to the realization of political 
values and possibilities of implementation of political goals, Dodik was slightly op-
timistic (0,269). He scored low (0,055) in prediction of role of accidents, and in his 
ability to forecast the future and political outcomes (P-5 index). What is particularly 
interesting about this timeframe is Dodik’s score 0,174 on I-2 index, which is of the 
weakest intensity in terms of his tactics. When it comes to “role of defiance”, which 
is explained by I-5f index, Dodik’s public declarations show an average intensity of 
0,411 during his second mandate.
There are three analyzed statements in the first cluster. One of them obstinately 
refers to Dodik’s perceptions of “Serb victimhood”, and reads: 
When [the ICTY] was established, all had been already written. And then, only 
those Serbs with the confirmed indictments were arrested. So, we have no inten-
tion to hear any attempts from anyone to make any of this our commitment or Re-
publika Srpska’s problem.10 
10 November 2017. https://rs-lat.sputniknews.com/politika/201711221113537990-dodik-o-pre-
sudi-mladicu-udzbenici/, accessed in June 2018.
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and 
We reject the possibility that this is a verdict against any story on Republika Srp-
ska. It only exists in the perception of Bosniaks in BiH.11 
Dodik used a similar rhetoric as in the first mandate, but his statements now 
tie Serbs to the ‘statehood’ of Republika Srpska, and masked goals of the ICTY 
toward changing the political realities in BiH through its verdicts. Namely, in the 
second mandate he firstly used the past tense when talking about how ICTY’s estab-
lishment and verdicts were written by the international community in order to put 
solely Serbs on trial. What is interesting about this statement is that Dodik speaks 
in the future tense, by saying how Serbs would not take the verdicts as something 
valid and as a political commitment imposed to them from the outside. He does not 
see ICTY’s verdicts as Republika Srpska’s problem, but he also does not say whose 
problem they are or should be. He only stresses how ICTY’s verdicts will have no 
legal consequences in RS, and how judgments remain in the sphere of historical cir-
cumstances about the past conflict, with no legal bearing whatsoever. It is evident 
that Dodik signals that RS, as an entity, is not legally responsible for anything that 
happened in the last war, and that only individuals committing the crimes can be 
considered guilty.
In the second part of the statement, he outlines a similar thought: 
The verdict is a proof of inadequate treatment of victims and it is absolutely selec-
tive toward the victims and perpetrators of crimes committed, which is conducted 
by the Hague Tribunal for years.12 
and
We see this as a slap in the face for Serb victims, for whose suffering nobody has 
been convicted.13 
In this particular news article, Dodik refers to Ratko Mladić’s indictment for 
genocide in Srebrenica, and argues that he had prevented the genocide that was 
planned for Serbs living in BiH and Croatia. He points out the inadequate treatment 
and selectiveness of the Tribunal toward Mladić, but also toward Serb victims. Ad-
ditionally, Dodik now puts Serb victims and perpetrators on the same level, and by 
equalizing them he is again trying to achieve and highlight general numerical rela-
11 BUKA. ‘Šta je izjavio Milorad Dodik’. November 2017. http://www.6yka.com/mobile/no-
vost/132050, accessed in July 2018.
12 November 2017. https://rs-lat.sputniknews.com/politika/201711221113537990-dodik-o-pre-
sudi-mladicu-udzbenici/, accessed in June 2018.
13 November 2017. https://rs-lat.sputniknews.com/politika/201711221113537990-dodik-o-pre-
sudi-mladicu-udzbenici/, accessed in June 2018.
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tivization of guilt. The statements clearly indicate Dodik understands and actively 
operates with the subject of Serb victimhood in the second mandate. He continues 
in similar manner as in the first mandate, and additionally highlights the inadequate 
treatment of Serb military personnel and victims. 
Both statements in the second cluster relate to Tribunal’s image of dysfunction-
ality and the inability to bring justice or reconciliation to the region. One of Dodik’s 
statements reads:
the negligible efforts in the reconciliation process that have been invested in vari-
ous local communities and in the territory of BiH, the Hague Tribunal has con-
stantly undermined with its decisions.14 
Dodik perceives Tribunal’s role as misguided, and that its pronounced verdicts 
will help to collapse the process of reconciliation among peoples in BiH. How-
ever, he did not explain whether it was because Serbs were dissatisfied with the 
verdicts that they decided the reconciliation should not be bolstered any further, or 
whether the reconciliation was never an option because ‘they’ knew the ICTY was 
installed to impose guilt. The second statement in the cluster highlights a similar 
point: 
The live streaming of the suicide [of Slobodan Praljak, HVO BiH General] in 
ICTY’s courtroom best describes the character, severity, and intent of that court. 
Perhaps this is the most horrible illustration of that judicial institution’s functions, 
which planted a new seed of strife in BiH and further alienated all of us from re-
conciliation.15 
On top of Dodik’s notion of the Tribunal as incompetent to fulfill its primary 
intent and main objectives, he believes the ICTY is the institution which planted 
a “new seed of strife in BiH” aimed at undermining locally-generated reconcilia-
tion attempts. In addition, he is implying that the ICTY is responsible for alienation 
of the formerly opposing sides in BiH. By using a very intense word “strife” he is 
warning about the new political conflicts, for which the ICTY should be held res-
ponsible. The final statement adds another layer to this point, and reads as follows:
ICTY’s closure will leave four truths behind: Serb, Bosniak, Croat and Hagueian. 
And today, we still ask who killed 30.000 Serbs in the last war.16 
14 November 2017. https://rs-lat.sputniknews.com/regioni/201711301113629735-dodik-hag-pra-
ljak/, accessed in July 2018.
15 November 2017. http://rs.n1info.com/a345970/Svet/Region/Dodik-Tribunal-nije-doprineo-
utvrdjivanju-istine.html, accessed in June 2018.
16 November 2017. http://ba.n1info.com/a229883/Vijesti/Vijesti/Dodik-o-Herceg-Bosni.html, 
accessed in July 2018.
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Dodik recognized the existence of “four truths”, but he did not say that there 
are “three lies” and only one truth, one of which might be shared among Serbs. The 
ICTY is not specifically targeted as the primary “bone of contention” between the 
competing ethno-national memories, but as a hybrid construction which serves the 
dual purpose of establishing a new “internationally acceptable” version of history 
and reinforcing one of the “narratives” that aligns with its own. 
The final cluster of statements illustrates Dodik’s persistent tendency to con-
nect the ICTY with the international politics directed by the Western powers. One 
of his statements reads:
The Hague Tribunal is a political court that is concentrated solely on “covering” 
the previously issued political orders on the character of the recent war and on the 
dissolution of the former Yugoslavia.17 
Dodik repetitively ties the work of the Tribunal with an international political 
“cover-up” of the events that brought the dissolution of Yugoslavia and evoked the 
events leading up to the last war. He is not very clear about whom he targets among 
the Western countries, but he is fairly adamant the Western powers played an im-
portant role. 
Dodik’s rhetoric on ICTY can be observed in the following statement:
I am certain that The Hague process against Vojislav Šešelj will provide a very 
significant contribution to the jurisprudence, but will also serve as additional 
proof of dishonor that has been promoted by the Hague Tribunal for years. By go-
ing voluntarily to The Hague, he was going to defeat the Tribunal. And he won.18 
Dodik again praises Vojislav Šešelj’s legal strategy against the ICTY and the 
attempts of the West to impose a political verdict upon him for crimes he “did not 
commit”. He is undermining the Tribunal’s legal foundation and ties Šešelj’s case 
to a notion of ‘victory’ over ICTY’s political patrons. In this way, Dodik aims to at-
tract political support of his voters in the General Elections held in October 2018, 
by portraying himself as an envoy of non-Western or pro-Russian politics, capable 
of negotiating political terms with the West. 
Conclusions
The aim of the paper was to analyze and systematize Milorad Dodik’s operational 
code toward the ICTY and its role in shaping political life in BiH. We collected re-
17 November 2017. https://www.blic.rs/vesti/republika-srpska/dodik-pravdu-haskog-tribunala-
najbolje-su-osetili-srbi/e634qwn, accessed in July 2018.
18 March 2016. http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/reakcije-nakon-presude-seselju-sok-i-nevjer-
ica-u-bih-i-hrvatskoj, accessed in June 2018.
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levant and widely disseminated public statements from archival sources of schol-
arly articles, and other online and printed sources, namely 9 statements during his 
first term as the President of RS, from 15 November 2010, and 10 statements from 
the second term from 12 October 2014 until ICTY’s closing on 21 December 2017. 
In order to compare his statements in the first and the second term, we used the 
operational code analysis (cf. Walker et al., 1998) to construct and explain Dodik’s 
belief system, which is made of ideas and attitudes in which elements are bound 
together by some form of functional interdependence. In order to assess the opera-
tional code beliefs, we employed the Verbs in Context System (VICS), which draws 
inferences about Dodik’s operational code beliefs and shows whether he presents 
cooperational or conflictual propensities. 
The results indicate the following: P-1 index of -0,560 points that Dodik was 
more conflictual in his first term. When the second term is taken into considera-
tion, the score of 0,366 points to low levels of cooperation regarding the outlook on 
the world. It can be concluded that he had a hostile view of the “political universe” 
in the first term, while in the second mandate his views were friendlier. P-2 index, 
which illustrates realization of political values and possibilities of implementation 
of political goals, showed -0,236 for all analyzed statements in the first mandate, 
which indicates weak intensity of pessimism, while the second score (0,269) ob-
tained after the analysis of Dodik’s statements during his second mandate implies 
that he was slightly optimistic in his speeches.
Additional statistically significant values were recorded in P-5 index that gives 
an insight into the leader’s prediction of role of accidents, and his ability for fore-
casting the future and political outcomes. In the first term, Dodik was exceptional 
in predicting (0,690), but in the second (0,055) his score was relatively low. When 
it comes to role of defiance, which is explained by I-5f index, Dodik’s statements 
in the first mandate scored an average intensity, slightly stronger than in the second 
mandate. This suggests Dodik’s changed rhetoric regarding the role of defiance.
When it comes to comparative content analysis of Dodik’s statements, it shows 
that Dodik’s public rhetoric in the second mandate was harsher and more confident. 
His wording regarding the ICTY mostly refers to anti-Serb political agenda and its 
inability to maintain a principled decision-making pattern. The majority of his pub-
lic statements also indicate that Dodik’s vision of justice and ICTY’s role in pro-
moting reconciliation locally is heavily politicized. Finally, it is important to high-
light Dodik’s belief that ICTY’s verdicts which are in support of his “relativization 
and equalization” goal are secondary in importance to his political goals of keeping 
ICTY’s dysfunctionality and negative image alive among the public and his voters.
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